FCA Operational Resilience & DORA: What Your Network Must Show
Since 31 March 2025, UK financial services firms have been expected to stay within the impact tolerances they set for their important business services. In the EU, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) has applied since 17 January 2025. And on 18 March 2027, the FCA’s new operational incident and third party reporting rules come into force. For IT and network teams, the common thread is simple: regulators no longer accept assurances. They want evidence.
Much of that evidence lives in your network. Every important business service depends on switches, firewalls, WAN links, wireless and cloud connectivity. If you cannot show how those components support each service, how they fail and how quickly they recover, your operational resilience self-assessment is built on guesswork. This guide sets out what FCA operational resilience and DORA expect, and exactly what your network needs to be able to prove.
FCA operational resilience and DORA at a glance
The FCA’s operational resilience rules (PS21/3) ask firms to identify their important business services, set an impact tolerance for each one (the maximum disruption the firm can tolerate before causing intolerable harm), map the people, processes, technology, facilities and information that support those services, and test their ability to remain within tolerance through severe but plausible scenarios. All of this is captured in a self-assessment document that the board signs off.
DORA takes a more prescriptive approach. It applies directly to EU financial entities and covers ICT risk management, incident classification and reporting, digital operational resilience testing, ICT third party risk and information sharing. UK firms are not immune: if you have EU entities, serve EU financial clients or provide ICT services to them, DORA requirements will reach you through group policies and contracts.
The FCA’s Policy Statement PS26/2 then adds a single incident and third party reporting regime, shared with the PRA and Bank of England. It defines what counts as an operational incident, sets reporting thresholds and requires in-scope firms to keep a register of material third party arrangements and submit it annually.
Three frameworks, one underlying question: can you demonstrate that your technology will keep critical services running, and tell regulators quickly and accurately when it does not?
What your network must evidence
1. An accurate map of the technology behind each important business service
Mapping is where many firms fall short. A service map that stops at “the trading platform runs in the data centre” is not enough. Regulators expect you to understand the dependencies underneath: which core switches, firewalls, circuits and cloud connections each service relies on, and where the single points of failure sit.
This is why up-to-date network documentation matters so much. Accurate topology diagrams, IP schemes, routing designs and configuration baselines turn mapping from a workshop exercise into something you can defend under scrutiny.
2. A complete, supportable asset inventory
DORA explicitly requires firms to identify and classify their ICT assets, and the FCA expects mapping to reflect reality. In practice, that means knowing what is on your network, where it is, what firmware it runs and whether the vendor still supports it.
End-of-life network hardware is a particular red flag. A core switch with no security patches and no replacement parts is a resilience risk you will struggle to justify in a self-assessment, especially if it sits in the path of an important business service.
3. Resilience by design: redundancy, segmentation and failover
Staying within impact tolerance depends on containing disruption. Redundant links, diverse carriers, resilient firewall pairs and tested failover all help, but so does architecture. Flat networks allow a single compromise or misconfiguration to spread across the estate, turning a contained incident into a firm-wide outage.
Well-designed network segmentation limits the blast radius of an incident and makes it far easier to show regulators that one failure will not take every important business service down with it.
4. Tested recovery, not theoretical recovery
Both regimes care about testing. The FCA expects scenario testing against severe but plausible disruptions, while DORA requires a risk-based testing programme and, for significant firms, threat-led penetration testing. A diagram showing a redundant path proves very little if nobody has pulled the cable.
Keep records of failover tests, recovery times and lessons learned. It is also worth understanding the difference between a network audit and a penetration test, because regulators will expect both resilience and security to be tested, and each answers a different question.
5. Detection and incident data you can actually report
Under PS26/2 and DORA, firms must classify incidents against defined thresholds and report within tight timeframes. That is only possible if your network produces usable data: centralised logging, accurate time synchronisation, alerting on critical devices and clear records of what failed and when.
If you cannot reconstruct the timeline of an outage within hours, initial reporting will be guesswork. Continuous monitoring through a security operations centre helps close that gap by detecting issues early and preserving the evidence you need for incident reports.
6. Visibility of third party dependencies
Carriers, managed service providers, cloud platforms and SaaS vendors all sit in the delivery chain for important business services. DORA requires a register of information covering ICT third party arrangements, and PS26/2 introduces a register of material third party arrangements for in-scope UK firms.
Your network evidence should show which third parties each service depends on, what happens if one fails, and whether contracts, service levels and exit plans support your impact tolerances. A single carrier serving both your primary and backup circuits is the kind of hidden concentration risk regulators want firms to find before an incident does.
Where a network audit fits
Most firms already hold some of this evidence, but it is scattered across spreadsheets, old diagrams and the heads of a few senior engineers. A structured network audit brings it together, giving you an independent view of your topology, assets, configurations, redundancy and security posture, mapped against the services that matter most.
If you are unsure what a network audit involves, it typically moves from discovery and data collection through analysis to a prioritised remediation plan. The same findings that support FCA operational resilience and DORA also feed into frameworks such as ISO 27001, NIST and GDPR, so the effort pays off across your wider compliance programme.
Practical next steps for network and IT teams
Start by confirming your list of important business services with the business, then trace each one down to the network components it relies on. Identify single points of failure, unsupported hardware and undocumented third party dependencies. Check that logging and monitoring would let you meet incident reporting timelines, and schedule failover tests for the paths that matter most. Finally, document everything, because in a regulatory review, a control you cannot evidence is treated as a control you do not have.
With the PS26/2 reporting regime arriving in March 2027, now is the right time to close those gaps rather than discover them during an incident.
Build an evidence-ready network
Opticore works with banks, insurers and investment firms to design, audit and run networks that stand up to regulatory scrutiny, including managed network services for the financial sector. If you want a clear picture of what your network can and cannot evidence today, contact our team to discuss a network audit aligned to FCA operational resilience and DORA.